A CHRONOLOGICAL STUDY REGARDING THE PLANNING PROCESSES OF THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF MINATOMIRAI 21, A WATERFRONT REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT IN YOKOHAMA, AT ITS INCEPTION STAGE

Initially published on April 3, 2016
Revised on July 19, 2019

Toshio Taguchi
Vice-president, Akira Tamura Memorial – A Town Planning Research Initiative NPO,
Ph.D. in Town Planning

Contents

Abstract
Chapter 1 Preliminary stage of MM21, its social context
Chapter 2 MM21 Stage 1: Planning issues
Chapter 3 MM21 Stage 2: Renegotiation of scheme
Chapter 4 MM21 Stage 3: Framework of scheme implementation and public contributions
Chapter 5 MM21 Conclusion
Acknowledgment
Appendix
Bibliography
Chronology
Abstract

Minato Mirai 21 ("MM21") is a waterfront redevelopment scheme that blends offices, residential and commercial uses in the center of Yokohama. It is regarded as one of the most courageous attempts at waterfront redevelopment in Japan. It started with a proposal in 1964 by Akira Tamura, an eminent Japanese urban planner. This work was commissioned by Ichio Asukata, a liberal socialist mayor of Yokohama city. They envisaged the relocation of an aging but operational shipyard, harbor piers and railway freight yards in order to create a new site which would connect two existing central districts that had been separated by these industrial estates.

Besides MM21, Tamura proposed other novel structural plans as “six spine projects” for Yokohama, which was then under population influx pressure from Tokyo. Because of the city government’s financial constraints and limited planning power, Tamura initiated a paradigm shift in planning principles towards ceasing reliance on paternalistic support from central government. He strongly advocated a local planning approach with local government initiatives and also the introduction of privatization. Tamura wrote numerous books detailing his peerless experiences as a leader of the new urban planning and coordination bureau of the city for ten years. However, a chronological study of his work based on historical facts has not been attempted previously. This research aims to clarify the detailed process for planning and negotiation of MM21. The roles and positions adopted towards the MM21 scheme of the concerned bodies such as the City, Mitsubishi Group, Japan National Railways ("JNR"), the Yokohama maritime industry, Japan Housing and Development Corporation and national ministries have also been explored.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries ("MHI") owned the old shipyard, and Mitsubishi Estate acquired most of the shipyard land, becoming the major landowner in the area. JNR operated huge freight yards within the planned area. As the area was exclusively a harbor district, the maritime industry of Yokohama wished to protect their interests. Tamura prepared a new industrial estate in a newly reclaimed area to relocate the shipyard which made it possible for MHI to expand its production. Tamura negotiated and reached a deal with MHI, but they could not make a decision on relocation due to the extremely volatile economic situation surrounding the ship industry. At the same time, Tamura persuaded JNR to either move or abandon their freight yards, which caused a strong movement of community opposition to the relocation. Tamura envisaged an appropriate size for redevelopment of the Mitsubishi Estate in terms of private investment by minimizing the volume of reclaimed land. By allowing the company to make decent profits from the redevelopment, the construction of public infrastructure and facilities was planned mostly through private contributions rather than public investment.

Tamura was later required by the new mayor to relinquish control over the second stage MM21’s execution, but Tamura’s successors were able to successfully execute the second stage of MM21. Regarding the privatization aspect of the project, Keiichi Ozawa as the new chief urban planner made a breakthrough by persuading the Mitsubishi group and the maritime industry to introduce a land readjustment scheme in the area and also provide a new maritime development area within it. After Ozawa left his role, Ryochi Hirose, as the next chief planner, helped concerned bodies to reach agreement on the final implementation plan in 1983. Both Ozawa and Hirose were reliable staff members of Tamura’s group. Although the redevelopment area was eventually expanded due to pressure from concerned parties, the continuity of dedicated chief urban planners made the project successful over a longer term.
Chapter 1: Preliminary stage of MM21, its social context

Yokohama is the second largest city of Japan, with a current population of 3.7 million. It was initially a tiny village, and rose to become the first port town opened to the outside world in 1859, at the end of Edo period. During the period when ships were the only means of international transport, Yokohama acted as a gateway to the world for Tokyo, the capital city of Japan. Embracing this history, the Minatomirai 21 (“MM21” hereafter) project area in the middle of the Yokohama port areas is an attractive development that blends offices, residential and commercial uses. It was planned as a waterfront redevelopment to accommodate 190,000 workers and 10,000 residents, and is seen internationally as one of the leading examples of urban harbor redevelopment (Fig.1).

The planning of this project commenced in 1964, with the only similar project having been attempted in Boston, U.S.A. Boston’s old harbor areas were transformed for the use of local citizens, though these areas were isolated from the inland area by its elevated motorway.

In the case of Yokohama, it was planned that the private shipyard owned by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries that was fully operated at that time would be relocated to a different and large site within the city. The new vacant site was intended to be used as a redevelopment project area in order to create a new city center by integrating surrounding areas. In Yokohama, unlike Boston, it was decided in 1968 that the urban motorway would be re-routed underground, changing the original elevated system. This demonstrated a proactive and forward-looking planning approach by a local government acting responsibly for the future of a city and its citizens.

Historically speaking, bombing by the U.S. Air Force completely destroyed the central part of Yokohama in March 1945. Shortly thereafter, the American army arrived at Yokohama and occupied the entire central area and also its harbor areas. Whenever attempting to understand a process of city planning it is necessary to have an overall view of its social and economic background as to why these city projects are needed. From the end of World War II until the period of rapid economic expansion in the 1960’s, a knowledge of the changing trends in Yokohama’s industrial structure is required in order to comprehend the necessity of the MM21 project. Therefore, the changing nature of maritime industries and shipyards must be understood.

Although the city center was devastated by the bombing, the occupied harbor of Yokohama was full of cargo servicing the American army. The outer harbor was constructed and developed into a new advanced harbor with container ship facilities during the era of high economic growth. As the availability of land in urban areas in Japan is generally limited, a popular option for acquiring necessary development sites is reclamation of the sea. A new method of financing reclamation using private investment called the Dezu-method (Dezu being the name of a local seaside area in Chiba prefecture) was invented by a local government in Chiba facing revenue difficulties. However, as the sea itself was coming to be acknowledged as a public asset by the National Assembly, it would not let the private sector use it solely
for the profit of private companies. At this time, environmentally conscious movements led by citizens were occurring all over Japan, which demanded that local governments and the private sector prioritize citizens’ welfare over financial outcomes.

As noted above, the shipyard of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries occupied the central part of the future MM21 project site. The company needed a bigger factory site to build large ships for export abroad, though it was difficult to predict the future trends in the world economy. In addition to the shipyard, there was a huge freight yard operated by Japan National Railways (“JNR” hereafter), and the management section of JNR had a strong desire to expand its freight train services. However, it was necessary to relocate the freight yard to a different site when commencing the MM21 project.

City planning is a process of transforming an environment where local residents live or work by using public funds or private investments. Through both its processes and its outcomes, local residents and private companies can receive benefits and sometimes suffer losses. Therefore, city planning needs a long-term perspective beginning from its preliminary planning stage and looking beyond implementation of the project. City planners know that a city will never cease to change, and they have to modify their plans according to emerging needs.

The Japanese city planning system is regulated in three tiers, being national government, prefectural government and city government. Planning regulations at the national level are originally formulated by the national ministries and then their actual measures are implemented by the prefectures and cities concerned. The national legal system tends to legislate reactively in response to intensifying social and urban problems that have been observed in cities. According to the Japanese local government system, citizens can elect their mayor directly. Municipal bylaws are locally made by a municipal assembly whose members are also elected directly by citizens. On the contrary, the prime minister of the nation is appointed by a majority of members of the political parties elected to the Diet, being the national assembly. There are often conflicts between mayors who are responsible for city administration and the local assembly who is responsible for making bylaws. In order to avoid these conflicts, mayors often promulgate ordinances as local rules at their discretion rather than requesting that the assembly pass new bylaws. These ordinances can solve emerging local issues in advance of national law-making achieved later by the national assembly. However, as for these ordinances, national government often accuses the local governments concerned of acting illegally in relation to law-enforcement. As Yokohama is a special large city, it has specific powers at both a prefectural government level and city government level. Therefore, it is possible for direct conflicts to arise between the city and the national government without the input of the prefectural government. This occurred particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, when Ichio Asukata was Yokohama’s independent mayor belonging to the Japan Socialist Party, although he never refused to negotiate with the national government, public organizations and the private sector whenever he thought it was necessary to achieve objectives for citizens. Asukata was a kind of political hardliner with a socialist background, however he moved carefully and acted cleverly for citizens.

As city planning is a long process that requires a long-term view, it is inevitable that the persons with authority to direct planning power cannot sustain their positions indefinitely. We should acknowledge that there is a natural turnover in the people in charge of city planning and its execution. Therefore, it is essential that measures are taken to sustain the visions, ideas and attitudes of the professionals involved in city planning. When researching the case of MM21, I tried to make necessary investigation of the background and the history of its planning process by obtaining suitable historical documents and reliable references from the project’s initial stage through its execution.

One of the primary materials available is a type of domestic policy formulation paper called “ringisho” in Japanese, which is used among concerned sections of the city government when deciding new policies. This document bears the mayor’s seal and officially acknowledges a new city policy. This is regarded as an official policy formulation paper of the mayor and is preserved indefinitely according to the municipal rules on official document preservation. Based on this rule, I requested that the city government make these documents open and available. The city library also holds old research papers which were useful for my research activity. Further, the city archive center has useful materials donated from retired city government officers who were in charge of the project at various stages and which have also been utilized for this research. I tried to corroborate the public documents with reference to private ones in order to establish their reliability. Further, I personally conducted interviews of key persons involved in the project. However, in cases where I could not obtain related primary materials that could support those interviews I
did not place significant reliance on their content. My research methodology required that I tried to avoid making assumptions when reconstructing the project’s history.

**Chapter 2: MM21 Stage 1, Planning issues**

It is regrettable that Japanese approaches to city planning are not more highly regarded around the world. Japanese architects who were globally famous were Kenzo Tange, Kiyonori Kikutake, Kisho Kurokawa and others representing a new generation of architects after the war. But as far as city planning is concerned, the radical works by them were confined to architectural drawings. Against this background, Takashi Asada who organized the Metabolism group at the international design conference of 1960 in Tokyo attempted to connect them with tangible city planning projects. To this end, Asada established the Environmental Development Center in 1961 as the first private city planning consultancy in Japan. Akira Tamura, a pre-eminent Japanese city planner (1926 – 2010), joined Asada’s office in 1961 (Fig.2).

Figure 2. Akira Tamura and one of his books “Fight of Akira Tamura” 2006

Tamura is an exceptionally notable city planner in the history of Japanese city planning, and was a person who both conducted actual city planning as the executive planner of local government and a scholar who had broad knowledge of city planning. He had learned from Kenzo Tange at the Architecture department of Tokyo University, then entered the Ministry of Transport to formulate a national policy for inbound tourism as a measure to welcome wealthy foreign tourists to an economically devastated post-war Japan. While working in this role, he also returned to Tokyo University as a law student. After graduation, he moved to a life insurance company in Osaka and worked in its land utilization section, and at the age of 36, joined the office of Asada. It is clear that Tamura had a locally oriented planning approach towards city planning, which was different from Tange’s more grandiose planning style.

Figure 3  Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Yokohama Shipyard and districts in the vicinity in the 1960s
Figure 4 Map of designated districts in the vicinity of the Minatomirai 21 project areas. MM21 was originally envisaged to connect two districts: old Kannai and Kangai districts and newly developed Yokohama railway station east and west districts.

Figure 5 The old districts and three groups consisting of the Minatomirai 21 development: A - Yokohama railway station east side district, B - Japan railway’s freight yard, C - Takashima pier, D - Mitsubishi shipyard, E - Japan railway’s Sakuragicho station district, and F - Shinko pier. Group 1 is Yokohama railway station east side district, Group 2 is called “the Central District” of MM21, and Group 3 is Shinko pier district.

Figure 6 The original waterfront redevelopment plan prepared by Tamura in 1964.
While he was in the Environmental Development Center, Tamura conceived a new idea to relocate the huge shipyard of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, a site of more than 30 hectares in the middle of Yokohama’s old city center (Fig.3). Because of the wartime bombing and occupation by the American army, the city’s functions had been greatly reduced. On the other hand, urban sprawl of the city’s housing developments at the periphery of Yokohama had expanded exponentially. This meant that Yokohama was becoming a residential city without a relevant and functioning city center. Further, its population was growing swiftly, increasing by 400,000 over just five years. In order to rebuild the functions of its city center, Tamura envisaged the creation of a new central district in between the old city center of Kannai and a new center that was already forming around the Yokohama railways terminal by using the shipyard and consolidating these three centers into a new unified central district along the waterfront (Fig.4, 5, 6). This plan was originally requested by the new mayor of Yokohama, Ichio Asukata, elected in 1963. Asukata was a mayor who proclaimed a new policy of “citizens first,” in contrast to his predecessor who had favored corporate interests. Asukata remained in office until 1978 and was very popular among Yokohama’s citizens.

In recognition of his strong work in relation to Yokohama, Asukata requested that Tamura come to work for the Yokohama city government to execute “the Six Spine Projects” proposed by Tamura in 1964 (Fig.7). In 1968, Tamura became the director of the planning and coordination bureau of Yokohama,
giving the city the dynamic pair of a strong politician in Asukata and an able city planner in Tamura. The city’s planning and coordination bureau was a special administrative section with the mission of streamlining the cumbersome city machinery and encouraging staff of the city to exhibit a sense of independence.

By enhancing cooperation between the different apparatuses of the city machinery Tamura strived to make the city government, which was then short of revenue and planning power, independent from the national government in terms of policy formulation and the execution of projects. He tried to establish an overall planning framework and rules for the private investment companies and developers according to which they could earn decent and sustainable profits.

By taking a far-sighted perspective to the implementation of the MM21 project, Tamura introduced a new paradigm for private initiatives. He believed that, despite its financially constrained position, Yokohama was full of city planning potential. In the case of redevelopment of large defunct industrial sites, it used to be a common practice for local governments to acquire whole sites and then subdivide them and sell the subdivided lots to private companies. However, Asukata and Tamura never followed such an approach. They believed that city planning from its implementation stage needed private investment rather than the limited public funds available to invest from cumbersome local authorities, generally speaking. Therefore, local governments needed to formulate local investment policies, especially for the private sector.

Besides the waterfront redevelopment project Tamura proposed other novel structural plans such as the six spine projects, including a planned residential and farming development of Kohoku New Town, and an environmentally conscious industrial estate in newly reclaimed land of Kanazawa ward composed of relocated factories from the inland area of Yokohama. As Japanese planning controls on the usage of land were very weak at that time, Tamura established a new land use control method in Yokohama using a strong local government initiative. He also set up an urban design team within the city planning machinery. He advanced the city planning policy of Yokohama and coordinated all the public policies on the basis of the three pillars of structural projects, development control and urban design.

With regard to MM21, Tamura initially tried to compress the development area into a 33.7 hectares site with a small reclamation area of 1.8 hectares (Fig.8). He concentrated the development into the limited area of the shipyard and freight train yard. The volume of development was confined to a scale so as to
make it possible to give responsibility to private companies yet also allow the development to become a connecting core between the two other existing centers. One of the primary objectives was that none of the three centers should become larger than the other two.

A new development company named “Yokohama New City Development” was set up by Mitsubishi group companies, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Mitsubishi Estate, Asukata and Tamura having advocated strongly for such a move. The main purposes of the company were the reclamation of the sea in the vicinity of the shipyard and redevelopment of the shipyard itself. The group of Mitsubishi companies is a conglomerate representing various Japanese business interests; its ship and machinery sector was at that time leading the group, which is now dominated by its space rocket business sector. Besides its industrial divisions the group has a real estate company, Mitsubishi Estate, which is a major land owner of the Marunouchi business district in front of Tokyo station, and which also once owned the Rockefeller Center building in New York.

Despite the formation of this new development company, it was very difficult to decide when the shipyard should move due to the changing economic situation of the shipbuilding industry. On one occasion, Mitsubishi expressed an interest in acquiring a large block of land from the city in order to expand its shipbuilding activities, however at a later stage it decided to abandon its new shipbuilding operations completely due to unstable economic conditions. Mitsubishi became very confused over its future policy. On the other hand, Mitsubishi Estate, which was expected to become the main developer of the old shipyard, formulated a redevelopment plan in 1972 and began negotiating with the city government (Fig.9). The development area proposed by the company was 62.7 hectares in total with 27.6 hectares of reclaimed land. However, in 1973 the national assembly amended the old Reclamation Act 1921 by limiting the right of reclamation to the public sector, to exclude the private sector. Because of this amendment, the city government was left with no option but to do reclamation by itself.

![Figure 9](image1.png)  Redevelopment proposal by Mitsubishi Estate on the old shipyard in 1972

![Figure 10](image2.png)  A basic concept of the city’s urban waterfront redevelopment prepared in 1975
Therefore, Tamura used his staff members with special expertise to conceive a vision for the waterfront redevelopment plan with input from Masato Ohtaka, one of the Metabolism group’s architects. The result was a testament to the success of the plan’s formulation and the shared image for future development among the parties concerned (Fig.10). Then, in due course, a tentative relocation contract concerning the shipyard was signed by the city government and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries with a clause providing for a relocation deadline of March 1978.

In 1966 JNR released a plan for a new freight railway within the Yokohama region in order to expand its freight volume. This plan received heavy opposition from concerned residents along the proposed line. As the new freight railway plan coincided with MM21, the city government was presumed to have accepted the proposal from JNR and in doing so extracted a kind of concession that JNR would agree to relocate one of its freight yards adjacent to the Mitsubishi shipyard. However, the city government’s primary goal to relocate the Takashima yard, a larger freight yard within the MM21 planned area, did not move smoothly, and the negotiations between the city and JNR came to a standstill.

A condition of the relocation contract of the shipyard was that the freight yards of JNR should move at the same time as the redevelopment of the shipyard itself. The Mitsubishi group companies were not confident of the success of redevelopment undertaken on their own. While the economic situation surrounding shipbuilding continued to deteriorate, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries was forced to consider the cancellation of the contract. However, Mitsubishi and the city government finally reached an agreement to extend the term of contract two more years until 1980.

However, during the period of intense negotiations, Asukata unexpectedly decided to leave the city to become the chairman of the Japan Socialist Party. This meant that Tamura lost his most reliable and trustworthy supporter within the city government. When the successor of Asukata, the new mayor Michikazu Saigo, came to office after the election, he dismissed Tamura from his executive post in the Planning & Coordination Bureau because of their personal differences.

Chapter 3: MM21 Stage 2, Restart of scheme negotiations

Keiichi Ozawa, who had negotiated strongly with the Mitsubishi group companies under the leadership of Akira Tamura, restarted the negotiations in 1978 under the new mayor Saigo. He was planning to follow the same development methodology, of encouraging a private initiative for the waterfront project, as Tamura had. While the city government wanted to make the site of the old shipyard into a new business center, the Mitsubishi group companies worried about its feasibility from the viewpoint of development potential. Therefore, they thought that some leading projects by the public sector such as an international convention center and/or arts museum would be beneficial for their development.

Ozawa gave deep consideration as to how the Mitsubishi group companies could be incentivized to take a longer-term perspective with regard to their responsibility for the redevelopment project. As JNR could not decide their future policy easily because of the planned privatization of the company, Mayor Saigo and Ozawa decided to postpone the relocation of the Takashima freight yard, the largest yard in the area. The city government and the Mitsubishi group companies agreed to a basic memorandum regarding the relocation of the shipyard and its redevelopment in 1980.

There were mixed views regarding the MM21 project among national ministries, i.e., some ministries expressed strong concerns about how to maximize their own interests on the project area. Generally speaking, all ministries have intimate connections with their own related business communities and so those communities’ interests hold strong influence over policy formulation. For example, the Ministry of Construction regarded real estate and construction companies as important, while the Ministry of Transport paid special regard to the interests of maritime companies. Although these two ministries were later merged into a single ministry by the restructuring of national ministries, the actual situation never changed. Those ministries tended to enact laws covering their own areas of concern, and those laws were generally respected by other ministries, which were careful not to act against the interests of each other.
Taking this background into consideration, in 1978 the city government organized a special planning committee of MM21 consisting of several national ministries, prefectural and city governments, the national housing development authority and JNR which was chaired by Yoshinosuke Yasojima, an eminent professor from Tokyo University, who had strong connections with both the construction and transport industries. The final concept plan by the committee was made open to the public in 1979 (Fig.11). After the committee had finalized its plan, the city government commissioned Ohtaka Architecture Design Office to progress the plan through several stages until 1982. Ohtaka investigated issues such as the size of the reclamation area and the overall volume of development, which required understandings from the Ministry of Construction representing the urban side and the Ministry of Transport representing the maritime side.

In the end, the maritime community of Yokohama demanded more reclaimed land with a vision of increasing future demand from the maritime sector, which demanded several changes to the development plan (Fig.12). Regarding the inner harbor, the redevelopment policy of the Ministry of Construction wanted to include harbor areas into their land readjustment scheme, but the Ministry of Transport wanted to introduce new urban facilities into harbor areas by themselves. However, the construction of those new urban facilities was prohibited according to old harbor area regulations which had previously been agreed between the two ministries.
Through protracted negotiations between the two ministries together with concerned city bureaus, the new international convention center and new memorial ship park were planned and executed as model schemes for urban inner harbor redevelopment which was open to the public. Ozawa believed that although sea reclamation could produce new land, if the actual demand for development land fell short of what was envisaged, new land would become useless and a liability in the future. Despite Ozawa’s concern about protecting the original vision of the MM21 project, all concerned bodies wanted to reach an agreement in order to increase the pace of development. In April 1982 the final volume of reclamation was agreed at 76.2 hectares (Fig.13). The total development area of MM21 increased to 186 hectares. Not long after this agreement, Ozawa was ordered to leave the section of MM21.

Chapter 4: MM21 Stage 3, Framework of scheme implementation and public contributions

After Ozawa left the office, his successor was Ryoichi Hirose who had made great accomplishments as the chief of the land control section as a policy maker under the leadership of Akira Tamura in the Planning and Coordination Bureau. Hirose improved the overall scheme of MM21 by readjusting the previous one-sided agreement between the Mitsubishi group companies and the city, especially from the viewpoint of sharing the development burden among the concerned land owners in the area. Then, together with concerned bodies such as the Mitsubishi group companies, JNR, the national housing and development authority and national ministries, he finalized a comprehensive and staged redevelopment plan (Fig.14). This plan also included concessions from two sides, i.e., on the finally agreed area of 186 hectare with reclamation, harbor redevelopment by the maritime side and land readjustment scheme by the urban side. Until then, the Mitsubishi group companies had been concerned exclusively with their own interests and were very negative towards contributing publicly such as by donating land for public use. Mitsubishi changed its policy and agreed to sell 8 hectares of its former shipyard to the public side comprised of the city and the national housing and development authority. This land was used by the city government to construct buildings such as a new city museum, a central factory for the local air conditioning system and lamps for the metropolitan motorway as public investment in the area.

Pursuant to the local ordinance on public information disclosure, transactions of land owned by the Mitsubishi group companies, national housing and development authority and the city government in this area were made public, which show the amount of contributions by concerned bodies towards the redevelopment process. As far as the Mitsubishi group companies are concerned, it can be said that they had made a reasonable public contribution with regard to the land readjustment scheme which also required land donation. Further, since then they have conducted their business with public responsibility as the largest landowner in the area, and constructed Landmark Tower, the tallest business tower in Japan, at an early stage of development in order to accelerate the development of the whole area (Fig.15,16,17).

Although MM21 is now very popular among citizens and tourists, the city government had to purchase a huge quantity of land from the JNR settlement corporation which had been established in 1987 to attract the necessary finance for the privatization of JNR. Because of this purchase, the volume of debt attached to MM21 increased enormously in spite of Hirose’s clever management of planning. At present there
remain a large number of unused plots in the area. Some people regard these as an asset for future use, but whether this will be borne out will be determined by the next generation to come.

Figure 14  A mayoral policy formulation paper from 1983 depicting areas of land readjustment and sea reclamation for MM21

Figure 15  Landownership map of the Japan Housing Development Authority
Legend: land attained by the land readjustment scheme by pale grey, and land sold from the city government by dark grey

Figure 16  Landownership map of the City government by pale grey
Chapter 5: MM21 Conclusion

The analytical methodology for this research is based on two approaches. The first approach, which looks at the continuity of the persons in charge of the project’s formulation focuses on the three city planners, being Akira Tamura, Keiichi Ozawa and Ryoichi Hirose. The second approach considers the vision of the scheme. Within this framework, it is hoped that the overall history and meaning of MM21 can be identified. As a tentative conclusion, it is the writer’s opinion that continuity of personnel and vision since Tamura’s departure has been capably achieved.

As far as the strategy to combine the three centers together is concerned, this has not been adequately achieved, primarily because the historical center of Kannai unexpectedly and sharply declined as an economic and social hub of the city. As a major private developer, Mitsubishi Estate has continued to make its best endeavors towards the progress of MM21. However, the size of the project became excessively ambitious through the expansion of reclamation and purchase of JNR real estate (Fig.18). Further, since its initial conception in 1964, through the tenure of the new mayor Saigo until the present, the city government has acted in haste to sell the land in order to meet the huge debts generated. In other words, MM21 has become too large a canvas to paint a dream. Ideally speaking, rather than moving under urgency to complete the redevelopment scheme, Yokohama would be better to bide its time.
Acknowledgment

The original version of this thesis was published in Japanese at the occasion of our non-profitable
organization's one-year anniversary conference on April 3, 2016 since its establishment in 2015. The thesis was made only possible with the consistent support from fellow members of the group and the kind advices given from public institutions and people concerned with MM21 project. I would like to sincerely convey my great thankfulness to those people, although I do not express each name. Lastly the only name I should not forget is Mr. Timothy Gray, who did a perfect editing work for this thesis.

Profile of Toshio Taguchi

Toshio Taguchi is an independent scholar of city planning and global education. He received a Ph.D. of City Planning from Waseda University and a Masters of Urban Design from the University of Manchester. He was born in 1952, growing up in Saitama prefecture. After he returned from Manchester, he met Akira Tamura. He was persuaded by Tamura to come to Yokohama and work for the city government as an urban designer. During the period of his employment by the Yokohama city government he was in charge of MM21 for a period and also organized a voluntary study group of young officers of the city government chaired by Tamura. Since then, he has worked in Shimizu Corporation as an educational consultant, and at one stage was a deputy principal of a private high school in Yokohama. He is always eager to expand his fields of expertise, and now lives with his wife in Yokohama.

Email: taggame@jcom.home.ne.jp

Profile of Akira Tamura Memorial-A Town Planning Research Initiative NPO

This organization, established on April 1 2015, has the mission of studying the history of city planning in commemoration of Akira Tamura, an eminent Japanese city planner. Expected research targets are the history of city planning of Yokohama, especially during the period of Ichio Asukata acting as city mayor and Tamura working for the city government, as well as the personal history of Tamura throughout his life. The results of research activities are published on the organization’s website and aim to provide the next young generation an opportunity to learn the philosophy and way of life of a city planner. In the near future an English version of the website will be made available online to reach a global audience. The president of the organization is Chihiro Tamura, brother of Akira Tamura.

Website URL: http://www.machi-initiative.com/

参考文献 Bibliography
14) 田村明: 田村明の闘い, 学芸出版社, 2006. 12
15) 横浜市総務局市史編集室: 横浜市史 II 第二巻 (下), 2000. 3
16) 横浜市港湾局臨海開発部: 横浜の埋立, 1992. 3
17) 三菱地所: 三菱地所社史下巻, 1993. 3
18) 横浜市企画調整都市科学研究室: 調査季報第 50 号, 1976. 6
19) 鹿島出版会: 横浜・都市計画の実践的手法, SD 別冊 No. 11, 1978. 11
20) 宮崎省吾: いま公共性を撃つ, 創土社, 2005. 11
21) 横浜製作所: 三菱重工横浜製作所百年史, 1992. 2
22) 鹿島良一: みなとみらい地誕生物語, 神奈川新聞社, 2004. 3
24) 榊原博行・金井久: ヨコハマ再開発物語みなとみらい21, 神奈川サンケイ新聞社編, 1982. 1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chronology of MM21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>A proposal for six slope projects, of which MM21 was to become one, was made to Yokohama by Takeshi Adachi and Akira Tamura of the Environmental Development Center.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Toei National Railway announced a new freight railway in Yokohama and an opposition group was organized by local residents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>A basic agreement for the sale of a shipyard site to the city of Yokohama was signed by the mayor of the city, the president of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and the head of Toei National Railway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Akira Tamura left the Environmental Development Center and became a director of the Planning and Coordination Bureau of the Yokohama city government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>A feasibility report on the construction of a new railway line for MM21 was officially announced by the Yokohama city government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>The negotiations for the sale of the shipyard site to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries officially began in response to an official request from the city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>A research report titled &quot;Basic plan for the development of the surrounding area of Nakanoshima&quot; was prepared by the Environmental Development Center.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>A new development company, Yokohama Urban Development Co., was established to develop the site of the former shipyard and its surrounding area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>An agreement by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to help fund the construction of a new railway line for MM21 was reached with the city government and the former shipyard owner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>A research report titled &quot;Basic plan for the development of the surrounding area of Nakanoshima&quot; was prepared by the Environmental Development Center.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>The Public Works Recession Law was amended to restrict the sale of land for use of a public service to the public sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Work on the planned area of the former shipyard and its surrounding areas commenced by the city's Planning and Coordination Bureau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>An overall development plan jointly prepared by the Planning and Coordination Bureau and Ohtsuka Architecture Office was titled &quot;A basic concept of the city's urban waterfront re-development plan.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>A tentative agreement (containing a condition allowing Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to defer the subscription of land for two years in consideration of the uncertain economic condition of the shipbuilding industry) was signed between Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the city government for the relocation of the shipyard to the Yokohama reclaimed site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>A special task force was established within Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to formulate policies for the relocated site development and the future of its shipbuilding industry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>An official request was made by Mayor Aoki to the president of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries about acceleration of the shipyard's relocation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>The relocation of the Mitsubishi shipyard to the Yokohama reclaimed site, which had been agreed between Mayor Aoki and the President of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, was deferred for another two years in accordance with the condition in the tentative agreement enabling Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to defer the decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Since Michiharu Saito had become the new mayor and Akira Tamura left the Planning and Coordination Bureau, Yokohama Cock, the Chief of the Planning and Coordination Bureau, formally began the Masterplan project with the support of the new mayor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>The urban waterfront re-development basic plan was released to the city government and concerned public bodies, by the planning committee chaired by Yoichi Iwatake, an emeritus professor of Tokyo University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>The official agreement was signed by the city government and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries regarding the relocation of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries shipyard and its future development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>The Yokohama urban waterfront re-development preliminary plan was prepared by Ohtsuka Architecture Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>The revised Yokohama urban waterfront re-development interim plan was approved by the city government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>The Yokohama urban waterfront re-development final plan was presented by Ohtsuka Architecture Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>The Yokohama harbor plan was finalized and shortly thereafter an announcement was made regarding its future harbor re-development plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>The second term of Michiharu Saito's mayoral term commenced together with the addition of the Planning and Coordination Bureau and establishment of the Planning and Finance Bureau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>There was an exchange of persons in city government posts between Kiyosumi Osawa of the MM21 project and Ryokichi Aoki of the land control section.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>A mutual agreement was signed among the city government, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Mitsubishi Estate regarding the re-development of the shipyard with shared contributions from all parties concerned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>A major policy formulation paper titled &quot;Basic policy for the land readjustment of MM21’s central area and agreement of the execution between the city and Housing &amp; Development Corporation&quot; was prepared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>The land readjustment of MM21 officially commenced, the planning stage having been officially completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Yokohama MM21 Corporation was established as a coordinating body for all concerned sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>The Pacific Convention Plaza Yokohama Corporation was established as a scheme designated by the national law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Privatization of Japan National Railways (&quot;JNR&quot;) and sale of their property in Yokohama occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Decision to extend the Toei Toyocho line to the MM21 area was made.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Yokohama Expansion was opened on the reclaimed land of MM21.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Establishment of Yokohama Minatomirai Development Company by the city government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Mitsubishi Estate Company and the Yokohama city government agreed to exchange the land of the Minatomirai Memorial Park, operated by the City Harbors Bureau, for the city’s reclaimed land by taking over the Minatomirai Memorial Park, which used to be a part of the old shipyard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Mayor Saito died during his term in office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Construction of Yokohama Landmark Tower was commenced by the Mitsubishi Estate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>The JNR Takanawabashi freight yard was incorporated into the MM21 land readjustment area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>The unused JNR Takanawabashi freight yard was purchased by the city government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>